National Law School Journal
Volume 7

Issue 1

Article 1

7-1-1995

Protection of Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of
Indigenous Peoples
Kamal Puri

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.nls.ac.in/nlsj

Recommended Citation
Puri, Kamal (1995) "Protection of Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples,"
National Law School Journal: Vol. 7: Iss. 1, Article 1.
Available at: https://repository.nls.ac.in/nlsj/vol7/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in National Law School Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact library@nls.ac.in.

(1995) 7 NLSJ 1

PROTECTION OF CULTURAL AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
Dr. Kamal Puri·

INTRODUCTION
Context
For indigenous

peoples all over the world, the protection

of cultural

and

intellectual property is a fundamental issue. Without effective protection of the
special interests they have in their culture, that culture is open to pillage in the
same way that indigenous peoples' lands and resources have been for more than
two centuries.' Survival for indigenous
peoples is not merely a question of
physical existence, but depends upon maintaining cultural and spiritual links
with the land and their communities. While the control of land and sacred sites
is essential to protection of cultural heritage, land alone is not enough. The
recent Native Title Act! in Australia is a welcome step, but further specific
measures dealing with the rights of Aborginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples
to control their cultural heritage are also required.
At present, Aborginal communities are principally governed by the same
intellectual property regime as all Australians. While this is effective in some
cases, it does not cater for the unique relationship which indigenous peoples
have with their cultural heritage. Arlistic works, traditional designs and oral
folklore are not simply viewed as commodities
owned by individuals, to be
protected for the economic benefits they may yield, but as integral parts of the
heritage and identity of the community to which they belong. Thus, current
protections
of intellectual property, based on the assumption
that intellectual
property is a transferable commodity "are not only inadequate for the protection
of indigenous peoples' heritage but inherently unsuitable"". Intellectual property
protection for Aborginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples which recognizes
their close and continuing links to their cultural heritage is vital because

Indigenous peoples cannot survive, or exercise their fundamental
human rights as distinct nations, societies and peoples, without the
ability to conserve, revive, develop and teach the wisdom they have
inherited from their ancestors.:l
President, Australian Folklore Association, Associate Professor of Law. The University of Queensland,
Brisbane. Australia 4072
1

Native Title Act 1993 (Commonwealth). The Act came into force on 1 January 1994.
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E·1 Daes, Discrimination M.ainst Indil!enous People: Studv on the Protection of the Cultural and
Intellectual Property of Indil!enous Peoples. (Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, Economic and Social Council, United Nations: 28 July (1993) at para. 32.
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Ihid at para. I.

Issues and Objectives
The impetus for protecting Aborginal cultural heritage is a deep-seated but
inchoate concern to Australian legal reformers, which does not translate easily
into clear-cut issues.4 However, there are five broad areas of concern.
The first issue pertains to "authentication". Aborginal people condemn the
reproduction of their traditional crafts in Australian and overseas factories,
which mass-produce the items with cheap labour. This causes not only an economic
but also a cultural and psychological threat to authentic practioners of Aborginal
arts and to the Aborginal peoples whose values those arts and crafts express.
The second issue relates to ownership. "Copyright in Western society is
attributable to each individual person, and is orginated by a single person, even
in those circumstances where the copyright is jointly owned."5 The current legal
intellectual property regimes fail to recognise that indigenous communities, rather
than individual members of a tribe, create and own cultural heritage and
intellectual property rights relating to it.
'-

The third issue, which b closely linked with the issue of ownership, is
expropriation. Expropriation represents a concern about the removal of valuable
artefacts and other items of folklore from their place of origin. A more specific
problem which this issue raises relates to works which have sacred and secret
character under Aboriginal laws. Should the aim be to forbid reproduction or
disclosure of works where this offends Aboriginal beliefs? Aboriginal people are
gravely anxious that some segments of their folklore are being destroyed, mutilated
or debased.
The fourth issue concerns the protection of the economic interests of
Aborigines in their works. Inevitably, items of folklore get in circulation. To a
large extent, the Aboriginal people do not mind sale and circulation of their
folklore, unless the works are of a sacred-secret nature. However, there is a
widespread resentment that the individuals and groups whence the items
originated are not given a fair economic return for that from which others profit.
The fifth and the most slippery issue raises questions concerning the kind
of legal protection which may be most appropriate for Aboriginal folklore. This
issue inevitably overlaps with the other issues. Among the several branches of
intelledual property (viz. patents, copyright, trade marks, designs, trade secrets,

4.

"The matter of the rights of individuals and communities in relation to their folklife has both an ethical
and an economic dimension, and their intertwining has produced a Cordi an knot with which the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) has been grappling for over a
decade." Report of the Committee of InQuiry into Folklife in Australia: Folklife - Our Livinll heritalle
(Canberra: 1987) at 256 [hereinafter cited as "Report on Folklife • Our Living Heritage"]

5

C.C. O'Donnell, A Short Note on Anti-Copvrillhl 1 (1985).
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confidential information, reputation and goodwill, unfair competition, and the
like), copyright law seems most appropriate to deal with the protection of the
creative expressions of folklore. However, as soon as one thinks of the copyright
mould, several queries crop up which will be discussed later in this paper.
This paper critically reviews existing legal mechanisms for the protection of
Aboriginal culture and intellectual property in Australia, including copyright law
and heritage legislation, before going on to analyse alternative proposals and
developments put forward both here and internationally. Finally, solutions have
been proposed, drawing from the pool of research completed both in Australia
and abroad, and suggestions have been made as to the most appropriate measures
to be adopted in the local context as a basis for future action. Although this
paper focuses principally on the Australian situation, the experience gained in
that nation is most relevant to other indigenous peoples of the world.
THE WORLD'S OLDEST LIVING CULTllRE
To understand the importance of intellectual property and cultural protection
for Aboriginal people, it is necessary to examine the historical, legal and social
context of the current study. Out of the estimated 15,000 cultures remaining on
earth,6 the Australian Aborigines represent the world's oldest extant culture.
Their occupation of this vast island continent spans 40,000 years.7 However,
they presently represent only 1.1. percent of the total population.s
From the commencement of British settlement in 1788 until very recently,
little respect has been shown by the laws of the Commonwealth and States of
Australia for Aboriginal customary laws, despite the fact that these laws represent
the soul of Aboriginal culture, the means by which the indigenous people can
descry the outline of their own cultural being. One obvious consequence of this
has been the death or absorption of Aboriginal customary laws into a modern

6

E. Linden, "Lost Tribes, Lost Knowledge" Time International,

7

DJ. Mulvaney, The Prehistory of Australia, 52

8

See the Australian

23 September, vol 138 no 12 at 50.

Law Reform Commission's Report The Recol!nition of Aboril!inal Customary Laws.
27 (1986) [hereinafter cited as "Report on the Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws"). It should be
noted that prehistorians put the Aboriginal Population of Australia at British settlement in 1788 at
between a half and one million people. See a/so, Maho v. The State of Queens/and (No.2) (1992), 66
A.LJ.R. 408 at 447, where the Court observed: [T]he numbers of Aboriginal inhabitants far exceeded the
expectations of the setUers. The range of current estimates for the whole continent is between three
hundred thousand and a million or even more." According to more recent estimates, Australia's population
of 17 million includes about 250,000 (or 1.5 Percent) Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people; See,
Australian Briefs, (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, February 1991). Torres Strait Islanders are
Australia's other indigenous people, belonging to the islands that lie between the tip of north Queensland
and the southern coast of Papua new Guinea. There are about 21,000 Torres Strait Islanders in
Australia. They, like Aborigines, have been greatly affected by European settlement See aLm the
Australian Law Reform Commission's Report, The Torres Strait Islands (Field Report no. 6, 1979). It
may be noted in passing that in contrast to the small population of Australian Aborigines, the population
of Maori people (the indigenous people of New Zealand) is 13 percent
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culturally indigent Western society. Ancestral designs are being reproduced without
permission and at the same time are being often distorted or worse still debased,
with their creators finding no recourse through their customary laws which
remain unrecognised in Australian courts. Hence, resort is made to a less than
comprehensive Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) which does not adequately cater for
their needs.
The destruction and/or desecration of cultural resources and disrespect for
customary laws cannot be put right by an award of monetary compensation - this
scenario is but another instance of the assimilation of the Aboriginal race into
Western society. Action needs to be taken to ensure that contemporary Aborigines
remain the "trustees" of the traditions passed onto successive generations. This
would keep alive the possibility of future recognition of Aboriginal customary
laws.
FOLKLORE AND ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE LIVES OF INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES
Links with the past strengthen and sustain individuals and communities.
The desire for roots is a basic human urge. Folklore is a mode by which culture
is expressed.9 Many see folklore as, in effect, archaeology of the mindY) Folklore
is a powerful means of bringing people together and of asserting their cultural
identity. It enables the present generation to appreciate the highly creative
genius of past generations and acts as a mirror which reflects their psychic
make-up and explains the primeval civilization of a race. II
Today although Aboriginal artefacts are visible in the Australian market
place, Aboriginal customary laws and folklore continue to suffer from neglect.
Aboriginal folklore, like Aboriginal artefacts, is strikingly original, particularly in
its characteristic fusion of pragmatism and myth.12
For Australian Aborigines, folklore has its source in the life of their people
and, like life, it evolves continuously. One of the common ways in which folklore
manifests itself is through artistic creations. The fact that works of folklore draw
upon custom and tradition for their basis means that the works produced by
later aboriginal artists represent a unique continuation of their time-honoured

9

Brunvand, The Study of American Folklore. 84, See also K and M. Clarke, Introducin~ Folklore 28.

10

W.P. Murphy, "Oral Literature" VIII Annual Review of Anthropology 115, (1978) See R. Dorson,
American Folklore 1 (1959); B. Toelken, The Dvnamics of Folklore 4 (1979); J. Rogerson, Anthropolo~v
of the Old Testament 23 (1978).

11

B. Ndoye, "Protection of Expressions of Folklore in Senegal" Copyright

12

M.P. Ellinghaus, AJ. Bradbrook and AJ. Duggan (cds.), The Emer~ence of Australian Law, d. Burnum
Burnum, Aboril!inal Australia 8 (1988). An artefact may broadly be defined as something man·made such
as a tool or work or art, whereas folklore refers to unwritten literature of a people as expressed in
stories and songs.
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374 at 375 [1989J.

myths and legends.13
Folklore is living heritage
Folklore is testimony of the past without which the present would have no
future. Indigenous peoples have deep spiritual and emotional attachment to
folklore and regard it as their communal "property". Folklore is constantly
evolving and there are many works of folklore which are new, either because of
their recent origin or because they are directly or indirectly derived from the
older works.14
Traditional visual designs, music, drama, and dance are closely linked to
Aboriginal religion. A dance or drama may form part of a sacred ceremony, a
rock painting may depict an ancient myth at a sacred site. As a result, certain
works of folklore are regarded as either sacred in their own right or are so
closely associated with sacred places that they cannot be shown, nor the themes
in them be disclosed, except to those few who have been admitted to knowledge,
to ritual secrets and mysteries by undergoing initiation or other special ceremonies.
Aboriginal Art
Aboriginal art is the world's oldest continuous living art tradition. In central
Australia, much traditional art takes the form of ground designs, produced for
particular ceremonies and created with natural materials used to make spectacular
patterns in the desert sand, e.g., clumps of dried spinifex grass are matted
together into a papier-mache type consistency and moulded into shapes such as
circles and curved lines. This form of art is not meant to be permanent and is
destroyed partly by being danced upon during a ceremony and completely at the
end of the ritual, because its sacred significance carries an obligation that it be
kept secret from the uninitiated.
Aboriginal art differs from Western art in that, within a particular group,
the designs and motifs are homogeneous and there is a firm relationship between
the pattern and its symbolism. This implies that personal interpretation is· not
possible, but the work represents a traditional imagery. Because aboriginal art
communicates ideas and beliefs, or can be "read", it has been described as a kind
of "visual literacy".
Significance

of Folklore and Issues Arising out of its Abuse

For Aboriginal people, folklore performs several important social functions.
It helps them to release cultural tensions and ambivalences, and it provides

13

See, Report on the Workinlo! Party on the Protection of Aboril!inal Folklore. (Department
Affairs and the Environment, Canberra: 1981) at para.l003.

14

See. S. Ricketson, The Berne Convention of the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works: 1886-1986.
313 (1987).
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of Home

amusement and education.15 It is a sort of "social cement" that exists outside the
formal or official structures. It strengthens social cohesiveness, raises the quality
of life and assists in the development and articulation of cultural identity.
Aboriginal people use folklore to reflect the past and make improvements for
their future. Folklore gives them a chance for creative self-expression through
music, song, dance, speech, and many other avenues. Such cultural manifestations
create an invisible bond among individuals and groups and forge social and
spiritual contact.
With the prevalence of the "Australian" trend in the Australian fashion and
design industries, printed fabrics featuring Aboriginal style artworks have become
popular. There is growing number of people who want to wear something
Aboriginal to indicate their support for Aboriginal art. Ironically, they do not
endear themselves to the aboriginal people because many of the Aboriginal
items (e.g., T-Shirts), they buy and wear without rea Iising that they are "stolen"
goods. Furthemore, the marketing of articles featuring Aboriginal motifs under
the name "The Aboriginal" causes deception and misleads the public into believing
that the articles are being produced by or with the permission of Aboriginal
people.
A fonn of judicial recognition of aboriginal customary laws re~arding
ancestral designs can be derived from two Federal Court cases. In Bulun Bulun
v Neijlam Investments and Others,16 the Aboriginal artist Johnny Bulun Bulun
succeeded in having a manufacturer of T-shirts withdraw the T-shirts from sale.
The defendant had reproduced one of the artist's painting, known as Atthe
Waterhole. The case also involved reproduction of artworks which incorporated
elements of other Aboriginal artists' paintings, from books and postcards. The
case was settled prior to trial. The manufacturers and two distributors gave
undertaking to the court and a substantial payment was made to the artists and
the clothing was withdrawn from sale and delivered up.
The second case, Yumbulul v Aboriginal Artists Agency Ltd.17 was more
definitive. This involved a Northern Territory artist, Terry Yumbulul who
commenced proceedings against the Reserve Bank of Australia for infringement
of copyright arising from the reproduction of his artwork, The Morning Star
Pole, on the Bicentennial $10 plastic currency note. He also sued the agent who
negotiated the arrangements. The artist claimed that the Reserve Bank had not
obtained his permission before reproducing the artwork. The Reserve Bank
relied on an agreement entered into between ~umbulul and the agent under

15

See, Report on Folklore - Our Livinll Heritalle. at 73.

16

[1987] Federal Court of Darwin, unreported, Noted in C. Golvan, "Aboriginal Art and Copyright: The
Case for Johny Bulun Bulun" E.I.P.R. 346 (1983).

17

(1991) 21 L.P.R. 481.
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which the Bank maintained that permission to reproduce Yumbulul's works had
been obtained. Neverthless, the Reserve Bank settled the dispute with Yumbulul
by agreement.IS
The action between the Yumbulul and the agent continued with Yumbulul
alleging unconscionable or misleading conduct on the part of the agent. The
subsequent action was dismissed by French J. in the Federal Court of Darwin.
However, some important dicta can be extracted from this judgment which point
to the need to recognize customary laws dealing with ancestral designs. French
J. stated that, "There was evidence that Mr. Yumbulul came under considerable
criticism from within the Aboriginal community for permitting the reproduction
of the (design) ... And it may ... be that Australia's copyright law does not
provide adequate recognition of Aboriginal community claims to regulate the
reproduction and use of works which are essentially commercial in origin. "19
There has been a widespread commercial exploitation of Aboriginal designs
which have been used, for example, on tea towels, T-shirts, sarongs, table mats,
decorations and restaurant menus, postcards, a range of souvenirs, wall hangings,
posters, fashion items, interior decorating, shorts (even underpants), and towels.
It is against this background of deprivation and dislocation that any examination
of legal protection of folklore should take place.
CURRENT LEGAL PROTECTION

OF ABORIGINAL

CULTURE

Variance Between the Aboriginal Customary Law and Copyright Law
Non-exclusive rights are a peculiar feature of Aboriginal customary law and
are not readily compatible with the exclusive rights of copyright. Aboriginal
communities follow the custom of tribal ownership of art forms and designs,
whereas the right to depict designs is determined by tribal customs and practices.21
Between themselves, Aborigines have their own customs and practices governing
copyright matters.21 There are severe sanctions imposed on painting images not
permitted by tribe.
Inspite of its applicability to Aboriginal works, the problem of protecting
folklore by copyright is one which has caused much discussion. Some
commentators have argued that copyright infrastructure presents several problems.
First, copyright is wedded to the concept of individual property rights arising

18

The Weekend Australian. 3-4 November 1990 at P 11.

19

Supra n. 17 at 490

20

K. Maddock, Copyrillht and Traditional Desillns - An Aborillinal Dilemma 7 (1989).

21

In his interesting article, M.C. Suehman, "Invention and Ritual: Notes on the Interrelation of Magic and
Intellectual Property in Preliterate Societies" 89 Columb L. Rev. 1264 at 1265 (1989) . has argued that,
far from being nonexistent, intellectual property rights actually pervaded pre literate societies and
figured "prominently in the complex of magical beliefs surrounding numerous aspects of daily life.
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from individual creativity. "It in effect carves out a sphere of rights from what
otherwise would be the free flow of creative ideas in the large 'public domain'.
Protecting folklore (would mean) essentially acknowledging an intermediate sphere
of intellectual property rights between individual rights, on the one hand, and
the national or international
public domain on the other. In terms of legal
history and legal frameworks, this is a radical idea."22
Second, the effort towards copyright protection of folklore raises the difficult
issue regarding the term of protection - should protection be limited to time? It
has been argued that perpetual protection will be justified because "the protection
of the expression of folklore is not for the benefit of individual creators but a
community whose existence is not limited in time."2J Third, legal protection of
folklore under the copyright system raises the question of originality. Fourth,
folklore owes its authorship
to the community, but under the copyright law,
authorship of the work must emanate from an identifiable individual or individuals.
Further, the work must represent the application of the author's knowledge,
judgment,
skill or labour. All these legal dilemmas about protecting folklore
have led some people to conclude that folklore does not fit the copyright mould
and further that copyright law is "ill-suited to the protection of folklore."21

Aboriginal customary Laws
There is no systematic collection available of Aboriginal customary laws nor
has anyone prepared any manuals or handbooks compiling all aspects of Aboriginal
law. According to one researcher, Aboriginal tribes had no hereditary chieftains,
no police force, no lawyers, and no judges appointed by a central government.
Yet strict norms of behaviour were enforced among them, and offenders could
even be put to death by local councils of elders. These derived their power from
their guardianship
of the sacred ceremonial sites and their knowledge of the
ancient traditions. The decisions of these elders were obeyed only if they rested
on the traditional norms and on what may be termed legal precedents?;
Despite
this lack of written laws there is a good collection of material on Aboriginal

22

A. Jabbour, "Folklore Protection and National Patrimony: Developments
Proetection of Folklore" XVII Cop.l/ri.l/ht liulletin 10 at 13 (1983) .

23

Model Provisions for National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit Exploitation
and other Prejudicial Actions (UNESCO-WIPO, 1985) at 22 [hereinafter referred to as the Model
Provisions for National Laws].

24

See e.g., J.. Weiner, "Protection of Folklore: I1l'olitiml and Legal Challen.l/e" 18 L.L.c. 56 at 85 (1987).
It should be noted that the Working Party on the Protection of Aboriginal Folklore also came to the
same conelusions that the "copyright" approach was not suited to the protection of Aboriginal Folklore
Report of the Working Party on the Protection of Aboriginal Folklore, 1106.

25

N.M. Williams, "Studies in Australian Aboriginal Law 1961·1986", R.~1. Berndt & R. Tonkinson, Social
AnthropolollV and Australian Aborillinal Studies, 192 (1988) (citing T.G.H. Strehlow).
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and Dilemmas in the legal

traditions and ways of life including
family structures?;

detailed

studies

of kinship,

religion,

and

There is a spiritual relationship between Aborigines and their land,21 It is
important to note that the High Court of Australia in its judgment in Mabo
pointed out that the traditional law or custom is not frozen as at the moment of
the arrival of Europeans in Australia in 1788.28 Subsequent
developments
or
variations do not make the traditional customs or laws less effective provided
any changes do not diminish or extinguish the relationship between a particular
tribe or other group and particular property, e.g. land or folklore.
Folklore belongs to the Aboriginal groups, or certain members of them, but
under the customary law there is no right or ownership which is distinct from
other rights and is equivalent to the concept of property rights under Australian
laws. Some have considered non-exclusive rights concept under the Aboriginal
law incompatible with the exclusive rights of copyright.29
Aboriginal customary law has no distinct right of ownership equivalent to
the Anglo-Saxon legal concept of property.JO As the chair of the working Group
on Indigenous populations, Erica-Irene Daes points out:

A song, for example is not a "commodity': a "good", or a form of
"property", but one of the manifestations of an ancient and
continuing relationship between a people and their territory,
because it is an expression of a continuing relationship between
the particular people and their territory. Moreover, it is
inconceivable that a song, or any other element of the people's
collective identity, could be alienated permanently or completely.·'Il
Traditional Aboriginal societies were not materialistic.J2
intellectual property were of great significance.JJ

However, land and

26

Note that the Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies in Canberra maintains-within its library the
largest collection in existence of archival materia! relating to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
people of Australia.

2i

Aboril!inal Land Ril!hts Commission - Second Report at paras.50-51 (19i4).

28

Supra, n. 8 at 422.

29

See, Report of the Review Committee, The Aboril!inal Arts and Crafts Industrv, at para 298 (1989)
[hereinafter citcd as "Altman Report"l.

30

Generally on Aboriginal customary laws See R.~1. Berndt and C.H. Berndt, The World of the First
Australians, (1985), especially chapter 10.

31

Supra, n. 2 at 22.

32

"The range of directly useful material objects is not large ... Basically for women there is the digging
stick. Fore men there are spears, spear-thrower, and perhaps the boomerang and club,". R.M. Berndt
and C.H. Berndt, SU/Jru, n. 30, at 1

33

Report on the Recol!nition of Aboril!inal Customary Laws, at 222.

ii.
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The ownership of all Aboriginal cultural property is governed by a complex
system of rights. Aboriginal artists paint according to strict traditional rules of
ownership. They are authorised to paint only certain stories and even though
there is room for individual creativity certain subjects must be portrayed in
particular ways according to Aboriginal customary law. An important distinction
between Aboriginal and Western ownership concepts is the distribution of rights
in Aboriginal society amongst groups. Ownership of certain works may vest in a
particular clan members, or members, whilst the rights to use the work may vest
in various other members for various purposes. Daes goes as far as to suggest
that:
Indigenous peoples do not view their heritage in terms of property
at all - that is something which has an owner and is used for
purpose of extracting economic benefits - but in terms of community
and individual responsibility. Possessing a song, story or medicinal
knowledge carries with it certain responsibilities to show respect
to and maintain a reciprocal relationship with the human beings,
animals, plants and places with which the song, story or medicine
is connected. For indigenous peoples, heritage is a bundle of
relationships rather than a bundle of economic rights:u
It is not easy to reconcile the two very different legal systems - that of
Aboriginal customary law having its group ownership, community involvement
and consensus decision-making and the Anglo-Saxon legal system which lays
heavy emphasis on personal rights and negotiations and, particularly, the concept
of an individual artist's intellectual·property. One Canadian researcher expounds
the legal setting in an eloquent manner, thus stating:
Their (First Nations peoples) claims can be heard neither in the
international regimes governing cultural property, nor in the
domestic regimes governing intellectual property. In cultural
property law the competing legal values which frame every question
are those of national patrimony and the "universal heritage of
mankind':' in intellectual property law the interests to be balanced
are those of "authors, " conceived of on an individualistic model,
and "the public" interest of preserving a common public domain.
In all these areas aboriginal peoples must articulate their interests
within frameworks which obliterate the position from which they
speak. 35

34

Supra, n. 2 at 26.

35

See, A Pask, "Cultural Appropriation
Culture" 8 L.P.J. 57at 63 (1993).

and the Law: An Analysis of the Legal Regimes Concerning
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What follows is a critical evaluation of the present Australian Copyright Act
1968 and its deficiencies in relation to Aboriginal customary laws relating to

ancestral designs.
The Viability of Copyright Protection
Probably most works of the individual Aboriginal artists will be protected
under the Copyright Act. But, in so far as it does that, the law will be operating
at variance with customary law which embraces the principle of non-exclusive
group
rights.36 Moreover,
the folklore which lies behind
its individual
manifestations
of culture receives no protection at all, and hence is open to
abuse.
Further difficulties arise from the fact that under the copyright system, it is
essential to show that the work originated from the author and that it was
original. How can a design derived from traditional artistic practices dating back
possibly millenia, be subject to protection as an original work? And who could
claim authorship and ownership of such works?

Authorship and Ownership under the Copyright System
Authorship and ownership are distinct concepts in copyright law. However,
even though the author of a work and the owner of the copyright in that work
may be two different persons, the basic rule is that the author is the first owner
of the copyright. This position is in stark contrast to that of Aboriginal customary
law which emphasises the concept of group or collective ownership of tribal
designs. The lauding of individual artists is very much a Western response to
Aboriginal art, and a facet of .Aboriginal artistry which Aboriginal people find
quaint.
The social organisation

of Aboriginal societies37 reveals the Aboriginal system

of collective ownership. The issue of clan ownership of a sacred design arose in
the Yumbulul case.:J8 The plaintiff had argued that the right to permit the
reproduction
of the morning Star Pole design rested with the clan which was
represented
by the elders of the Galpu clan of North-East Arnhem Land. The
right did not vest with himself. Therefore with respect to any reproduction
of
clan-owned sacred designs one must not only obtain the permission of the artist
but also the clan manager. If all are not in agreement
then one may not
reproduce
the design. If an artist authorizes the reproduction
without prior
consultation or in defiance of the clan then that artist is likely to suffer sanctions

36.

Supra, n. 13 at 705.

37

The conception that all Aboriginal people are one is considered far too simplistic a notion by most
Aboriginal people. Within and betwccn communitics, Aborigines have always rccogniscd both cultural
unity and diversity.

38

Supra, n. 17.
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imposed
knowingly

by the clan. The individual
authorise

the reproduction

artist will be punished

even if he does not

as occured in that case.

As one commentator points out Blackburn J's error in Milirrupum v Nabalco
Pty. Lldl!) lay in his perception that proprietary rights in land can only be vested
in individuals.
He never recognized
the Aboriginal clan as more than an
indeterminate
collection of individuals and no statute provided for the vesting of
title in such a group.40 This non-recognition
of collective ownership of land was
corrected by Mab041 and now the copyright legislation must likewise accommodate
for the collective ownership of ancestral designs.
Under the Copyright Act, copyright protection is not ava.ilable where the
authorship.
of a work cannot be established.
One of the factors which is
omnipresent in the growth, development and shaping of folklore, is its anonymity.
Most works of folklore are the product of the community or group as a whole,
and not the creation of individual:;. However, it is conceivable that folklore, say a
folk song, may own its origin to a single author, but it does not acquire its
folklore character until it submits to the reworkings and reformulations
of the
community to whicb the author belongs.42 This leads to the common belief on
the part of various commentators that anonymity creates a barrier for copyright
protection. They argue that it is very difficult, often impossible, to indentify the
author or authors. Many works are the result of collective effort, and are often
not thought of as the creations of individuals, but of a family, tribal or other
social grouping.~3
. One argument
copyright protection

which has been put forward time and again in refusing
for folklore is that folklore has no identifable author and

therefore
in some ways it is a spontaneous
folk creation.11
However, one
commentator has forcefully refuted this misconception in the following words:

This opinion does not stand up under critical examination, however,
either in copyright or in ethnographic doctrine. Cultural phenomena are
generally speaking individual creations, even if they have undergone
modification and have been absorbed by a community to the extent of becoming
its own cultural property. There are in fact limits to the "collectivization" of
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creative activity: the making of a judgment, and the combining in a single act
of [he design and planning of the whole, can indeed only be the work of a
single thinking being, which no creative group could ever replace.1!i
Aboriginal "authors" of a design would mostly disclaim ultimate authorship.
In a great many cases, the artist has learnt the skill from someone else, who in
turn had been taught it. It would be difficult or impossible to identify the
originator - he or she might be long dead. In a few instances, the design is new,
having been communicated to a person by a spirit. In that case, the first human
user or users could be readily identified.
In the present author's view, it should be of no consequence that Aboriginal
artists draw upon their cultural traditon because no such criterion is used for
evaluating
the non-Aboriginal
or European
art. Furthermore,
in Aboriginal
communities two or three people often work on the one painting - the end result
being a co-operative endeavour. However, in some clans the tradition is that the
person who initiates the choice of ancestral design to be depicted will always be
presented as the author even if that person has been assisted by others and
occasionally even if that person has not personally done the actual painting.
Hence an author can be readily identified for the purposes of protection under
the Copyright Act. However, the problem remains that the underlying folklore,
of which individual works are expressions, is not protected under the Copyright
Act because it is communal owned, and no author/group
of authors can be
isolated.~G

Originality
Section 32(1) of the Copyright Act provides that copyright only subsists in
a published or unpublished literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work if it is an
"original work." A work protected by copyright generally bears the distinctive
imprint of its author.H
The requirement
of individual authorship and originality is said to create
another hurdle in the way of copyright protection of folklore. It is argued that
since folklore usually draws upon pre-existing tradition and "results from a
constant and slow impersonal process of creative activity exercised through
consecutive imitation" within a traditional community, the condition of originality
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Cultural Rights" 7 E.I.P.R. 227 at 229

may not be met under the copyright law.~HThis may be so with sacred restricted
ancestral designs which must be replicated precisely. These designs are said to
have been given to humankind by the original creator's ancestors and must be
reproduced
with unfailing accuracy if they are to retain their power in the
ceremonial context. Such designs however are not produced for the commercial
"open" art market and hence are not of our present

concern.

The issue of originality has not been raised in the case law. In both Bulun
Yumbulun511 the artists involved were of high standing within their

Bulun~9 and

community and the Western art world and hence the works were deemed original
and individual in art style. Margaret West, the curator of Aboriginal Art and
Material Culture at the Northern Territory Museum of Arts and Sciences, as
chief deponent for Bulun Bulun remarked that, "While many bark paintings
represent traditional designs it neverthless remains that particular artists have
their own distinctive ways of expressing the traditional designs.""]
The Bulun

Bulun52

approach

amounted

to legal acknowledgement

that

Aboriginal artistic works are capable of being original within the meaning of the
Copyright Act. This acknowledgement
was affirmed in the Yumbulun5:1
case
where the Northern Territory Federal Court held for the first time that originality
in an Aboriginal artistic work. In the words of French. J,: "In the sense
relevant to the Copyright Act 1.968 (Cth), there is no doubt that the pole was
an original artistic work, and that he (Yumbulul) was the author in whom
copyright subsisted. '~4

existed

the

Many works of folklore are produced from traditional themes derived from
Dreamtime. The continual re-creation of these themes serves to sustain

spiritual connection to the land. Transmission
of themes through Aboriginal
folklore from one generation
to the next safeguards the authenticity
of the
Dreamtime. The degree of variations in transmission
of these themes varies
greatly from one group to another

and from one medium to another.""
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Transmission requires creative reinterpretation
of themes by individual artists.
Evidently, nowhere is an Aboriginal artist merely an automation.56 Nor are few
themes completely ruled out. Inevitably, changes occur in depicting the same
stories in various artistic forms. These changes often imbibe each artist's
individuality,
hence giving the work its "originality" in the copyright sense.
"(T)he requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will
suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess
some creative spark, 'no matter how rude, humble or obvious' it might be.":i7 To
deny that Aboriginal artists produce "original works" is to deny the dynamic
nature of the living aboriginal culture.
Again, it is of no consequence that the creativily of an individual Aboriginal
artist is controlled by folkloric themes or in some other manner, e.g., selection
from a particular clan. These factors do not disqualify non-Aboriginal
artists
from the protection of copyright law, even if their creativity is kept within the
bounds of certain (cultural) norms.

Fixation
The Copyright Act, 1968, precludes oral works from having copyright
protection. Therefore copyright attaches when the ancestral design is fixed in
material or tangible form. Section 22(1) provides that copyright will subsist from
the time when "the work was first reduced to writing or to some other material
form." In other words, fixation is a condition of protection. There is a lack of
material fixation in the case of spoken or performed works.
In most cases, expressions of folklore are handed down orally through the
generations without ever having been reduced to a permanent form. Most folklore
is orally transmitted.
Folklore is maintained in the collective memory of the
people and is passed onto the succeeding generation orally. The members of the
present generation are merely "lrustees" of tribal traditions. Although the real
substance of traditional songs, stories and genealogies may be relalively unchanged
down through the ages, they do not have any material form.5R In this regard,
folklore suffers from an inherent contradiction:
while its actual existence is
solely for the duration of each occasion, it exists and lasts, notwithstanding
ephemeral character, in the collective memory of a people.59

its

The oral nature of much lolklore does not, therefore, appear to agree with
this condition of copyright. One of the fundamental principles of copyright law is
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that

ideas and themes

are not protected;

the form and /'tot the substance

is

protected. Nor are artistic styles and techniques protected as such. This means
that, for example, the acrylic dot style which Aboriginal painters commonly use
is not protected by copyright. However, a remedy may be available under the
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) or through the common law action of passing off,
e.g., if the use of the style would mislead the public about the identity of the
artist. Similarly, the copyright law will not prevent non-Aboriginal persons from
taking traditional themes and using them for their own works.
The fixation requirements
is constructed to imply that unless a work takes
a material form, one cannot tell whether it has passed the "idea"phase. Further,
one cannot ascertain whether the artist is a qualified person under section 32 of
the Copyright Act, 1968, at the time when the work was made. In addition, it
appears that section 29(3) excludes oral literature from the term publication.
This absence of protection has lead to what one commentator
terms the
"new bastardization"
of Aboriginal art as commercial manufacturers
create their
own versions of Aboriginal art.GU Tourist shops now stock T-Shirts having designs
which may appear to be works of Aboriginal Art. The use of another person's
ideas, artistic style or technique does not infringe copyright. Therefore, the
Aboriginal community has no legal recourse where a non-Aboriginal artist produces
his or her own rendition of a sacred Aboriginal design which appears as an
Aboriginal artwork but is not copied from a particular Aboriginal artist. Yet in
such a scenario Aboriginal customary laws have been breached and great offence
is incurred by the community.I;1
One commentator

addresses

the issue of why a European

artist should

be

prevented
from altering or interpreting
an Aboriginal design? Why should
Aboriginal ideas be protected while European religious icons have been made
the subjects of interpretation
in art work? His answer is that sacred Aboriginal
designs are not "ideas" in the same sense as Cubism or Dadaism·
They are
"property" in the most basic sense. He maintains that the distinction between
real and intellectual property is of no significance under Aboriginal customary
law. It is a property right, not just a mere idea, which is infringed when a sacred
design is employed in an unauthorised
way.62
Another scenario in which customary laws are breached yet no redress is
provided by the Copyright Act involves the appropriation
of sacred designs
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which are not the work of any identifiable individual or the combination
of
sacred designs such that the work of anyone individual is not readily identifiable.
In the latter scenario the crucial question under copyright law is the extent to
which the ancestral design has been altered or combined with elements of other
designs. If little or no alteration has occured, copyright or other protection may
exist. However, if there has been substantial alteration, the disputed material will
be regarded as the non-Aboriginal creator's own original work.
A remedy may be available under
Trade Practices Act, 1974 (Cth). The
misleading conduct in trade. An action
a person sells artwork representing
it
in fact that is not the case.

the consumer protection provisions of the
relevant provisions prohibit deceptive or
under these provisions may apply where
to be the work of Aboriginal artists when

The need for material form leads to difficulties in protecting not only visual
ancestral designs but the other forms of ancestral design, viz music, dance,
myths. Since these are not recorded (e.g., on tape, video or film, paper), they are
not protected. The question of the use of tape recorder by participants in secret
ceremonies
is still a vexed one as the person who reduces the ceremony to
material form (e.g., via a film) is the copyright owner of that particular film.
Likewise, folk tales which have been passed down orally are not protected
by copyright unless they are recorded in a material form. There would be
difficulties in protecting visual art as well since it is not usually in tangible form,
such as body painting and ground painting. The need for material form can,
however, be overcome by making sound recordings or films of performances
of
music or dance. If that was done, the act of recording works would be the
technical determinant of the time of the making of the works and hence copyright
protection would be available, assuming that other requirements
will be met.(iJ
But this is not always practical or desirable, given the secret and sacred nature
of some ceremonies or other works.
It is important

to note that unlike the countries

following the Anglo-Saxon

legal tradition, in countries which follow the continental
legal system (e.g.,
Germany), works need not even be fixed in some material form to be protected.
it is submitted that the fixation requirement
should not apply to ancestral
designs and works of folklore. Such works form part of cultural heritage of
Aborigines and their very nature lies in their being handed on orally or visually
from generation to generation. It is worth noting that the Tunis Model Law on
Copyright, 1976, made an exception to the fixation rule (as applicable in countries
following the Anglo-Saxon legal approach), particularly since, if this requirement
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were sustained, the copyright in such works might well bclong to the person
who takes the initiative of fixing them.HI Therefore if comprehensive
copyright
protection for ancestral designs is to be attained, the need for writing, notation,
printing and publishing of the work must be removed.

Duration of Protection
The duration
generally 50 years
that in the light of
such duration of

of copyright in literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works is
after the death of the author of the work.H:; It is submitted
the cultural and religious significance of the ancestral designs
protection is inadequate.
For thousands of years
prior to

colonialism in Australia these designs which have imbued individuals with kinship
ties, religious beliefs, and land ownership, were passed on and continue to be
passed on from one generation to the next. Copyright law must be amended to
incorporate
the need for protection in perpetuity for ancestral designs or else
there exists a very real possibility that in the next two to three decades, recorded
and/or published ancestral designs could be bought in the open market, which
in turn would result in non-Aboriginal
pcople owning works of traditional
Aboriginal culture, custom, language and history.
Hence, with the present limitation under the Copyright Act, Aboriginal
descendants who in a traditional context would be the owners of such work, may
become culturally dispossessed
and impoverished to the point that they must
seek permission to use or have access to information once owned and/or created
by their ancestors.
It is significant to note that thc Working Group on the Intellectual Property
Aspects of Folklore Protection, establishcd under the joint auspices of UNESCO
and WIPO, felt that the duration of protection should not be limited in time.';H

Heritage Legislation
In 1984 the Commonwealth
Parliamcnt passed the Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act which was followed by an amcnding Act
in 1987. The Act sets out procedures for the protection of Aboriginal places,
objects and remains, and provides heavy penalties for offences under the Act.
Under the Act the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, on the request of Aboriginal
people, may declare that a certain site or object is protected as part of Australia's
Aboriginal heritage. Provisions governing Victoria, introduced in 1987, provide
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that Victorian Aboriginal communities
may request the Minister to protect
"Aboriginal cultural property", with the matter going to arbitration
if such a
request is refused. "Aboriginal cultural property" encompasses "folklore", defined
as including songs, rituals, ceremonies, dances, art, customs and spiritual beliefs.
While the Victorian provisions in particular do provide some protection for
Aboriginal folklore, they are not ideal. The approach taken under heritage
legislation of piecemeal declarations on request does not address the fundamental
issue involved in indigenous peoples' rights to control and preserve their own
cultural heritage.I;7 As Daes notes it is difficult to attempt to nominate specific
sites of cultural importance since" [alII lands and resources are, to a greater or
lesser extent, sacred and integral to indigenous peoples' cultures and spritual
life, and often the most important places cannot be revealed to outsiders."ti8 In
short, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act, 1984, is
administratively
cumbersome
and it is questionable
whether it overcomes the
inadequacies of the Copyright Act.

THE POSSIBILITIES

FOR COMMON LA W PROTECTION

The settled/conquered

colony debateli!l

The refusal of Australian
law to recognise Aboriginal customary
laws
regarding ownership of land and intellectual property rights, including the use
of ancestral designs, finds its roots in the operation of the common law doctrine
of terra nullius The British colonisers treated Australia as terra nullius - a land
without owners, without a system of government and no recognisable commerce.
With the colonisation of Australia after 1788, a new legal regime was applied,
based on the common law. Australia was treated, for the purposes of its acquisition
and the application of English law, as a settled colony, that is, one uninhabited
by a recognized sovereign or by a people with recognisable institutions and laws.
Thus, no treaties were concluded with Aboriginal groups, and no arrngements
were made with them to acquire their land, or to regulate dealings between
them and the colonists.
communities.

They were treated

as individuals,

not as groups 'Or

The decision to classify the "new" country of Australia as a settled colony,
rather than as conquered or ceded. meant that the new settlers brought with
them the general body of English law, including common law, e.g., pertaining to
land ownership and intellectual peoperty. The general body of English law, so

67

Supra, n. 35, at 78-81

68

See also, Supra, n. 2 para 166 "Perhaps the most glaring point of dislocation is between the demand of
Native Communities for control over access and the demand of the legal system for disclossure".

69

For a good discussion on this issue see, Supra, n. 8, at 10

19

far as it was applicable to colonial conditions, became the law of the colony. By
that law, the Crown acquired the absolute beneficial ownership of all land in the
territory so that the colony became the Crown's domain and no right or interest
in any land in the territory could be thereafter possessed by any other person
unless granted by the Crown.
Applying

British

law to Aborigines

has produced

special difficulties

in the

recognition of their proprietary rights in folklore. Had Australia been treated as
a "conquered"
colony, Aboriginal customary laws, to the extent that they had
not been expressly repealed, would presumably have applied, at least in their
application to Aborigines.7(1
Aboriginal people were therefore fully subjected to Australian law.71 The
law did not recognise Aboriginal customary laws. This stance was reaffirmed in
the Milirrupum v Nabalco Ply Ltd'2 case in which a group of Aborigines sued a
mining company and the Commonwealth. The Aborigines claimed relief in relation
to the possession and enjoyment of areas of land owned by them under customary
laws.
Blackburn] of the Northern Territory Supreme Court decided that Aborigines
had no legal claim to the land since all applicable English law came into operation
in the colony from the date of settlement.7:l
This view that Aboriginal rights were completely terminated by the act of
annexation was unquivocally rejected in the r~cent decision of the High Court in
Mabo v The Slale of Queensland. il In this historic decision, the High Court of
Australia by a majority of 6 to 1 (Dawson ]. dissenting) incontrovertibly recognized
the prior legal occupation by indigenous people of the Murray Islands in the
Terres Strait. As a result, the Meriam people. who were in occupation of the
Islands for generations
before the first European
contact, were granted
occupation, use and enjoyment of their native lands in accordance with their
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indigenous

laws or customs.

The Court

ruled that white colonization

had not

extinguished the traditional land rights of the indigenous people. this landmark
ruling, which ended a decade long legal battle has established a major precedent
for future land rights and arguably intellectual property cases.7:;
Although the High Court was careful to point out that the /lfabo decision
applied only to the Murray Islands under certain conditions, it is submitted that
the case has far wider ramifications and raises a wide range of legal issues. More
particularly,
it is submitted that this recognition of Aboriginal customary laws
with respect to land extends to the recognition of customary laws with respect to
Aboriginal
folklore, including ancestral designs. This submission
is further
supported by the fact that through Aboriginal eyes, ancestral design themeselves
represent
a proprietary
interest, i.e., that they represent the "title deeds" of
Aboriginal land ownership. This argument
is succinctly summarized
by one
commentator
who describes
the connection
between "real" property
and
"intellectual"
property under Aboriginal law as "a relationship so close that the
two are inextricably

entwined.""i

It is immaterial that the laws and customs of the indigenous people have
undergone
some change since the Crown acquired sovereignity provided that
the general nature of the connection between the indigenous people and customs
remains.77 Brennan. J, remarked thus, "[T]here may be other areas of Australia
where native title has not been extinguished
and where an Aboriginal people,
maintaining their identity and their customs, are entitled to enjoy their native
title."78 Likewise, Toohey J.,observed that, "non basic distinction need be made,
for the purpose of determining what interests exist in ancestral lands of indigenous
peoples of Australia, between the Meriam people and those who occupied and
occupy the Australian
mainland."7!' Thus, where a group 'has continued
to
acknowledge the laws and (so far as practicable) to observe the customs based
on the traditions of the group, whereby their traditional connection with the
land has been sufficiently maintained, the traditional community title of that
group can be said to remain in existence. On the other hand, a native title which
has ceased with the abandoning of laws and customs based on tradition cannot
be revived for contemporary recognition.xlI

75

The inadequacy of the present intellectual property rcgimc, spccially copyright law. for the protcction of
Aboriginal folklorc is wcll-cstablishcd. See Supru, n. 13 and analysis of this and relatcd issues, See,
K Puri, "Auslruliun Ahllrighwll'ellple
unJ Their Flilklore" NGULAIG ~1onograph 9. Aboriginal and
Torrcs Strait Islandcr Studies Unit, Thc Univcrsity of Quccnsland (Brisbanc: 1992).

76

S Gray, "Ehrrlinh, Dealing and Dcconstruction:
Luw /iullelin at 11 (1993).

77

Supru, n, 8, at 435

78

IhiJ, at 434

79

IhiJ, at 482

80

lhiJ, at 430

Aboriginal Art and thc Land Post·~1abo" 63 Ahorighwl

21

Such laws and customs however, must not be repugnant to natural justice,
equity and good conscience. Once these tests are satisfied, native title, being
recognised by the common law, may be protected by such legal or equitable
remedies as are appropriate to the particular rights and interests established by
the evidence whether proprietary or personal and usufructuary in nature.XI Thus
in theory, any other tribe or clan fulfilling these conditions could equally claim
the recognition of their native title, as was accorded to the Nurray Islanders.
Brennan. J, saw no reason why the common law should not recognise novel
interests in land which, not depending on Crown grant, were different from
common law tenures.82 This reasoning could be applied to rights or interests not
directly related to land but perhaps to sacred objects, ceremonies or customs,
which could be recognised at law even though they do not stem from the
common law, as long as they were not inconsistent with the fundamental principles
of the common law.
Brennan. Jls statement that in the present day and age it was imperative
that "the common law should neither be, nor be seen to be frozen in an age of
racial discrimination"x:1 is most significant and is a clear pointer to the judicial
apporach in matters involving Aboriginal rights in the 1990s and beyond. This
sentiment was reinforced by Deane and Gaudron. JJ, by their observation that,
"Acts and events by which dispossession in legal theory was carried into practical
effect constitute the darkest aspect of the history of this nation. The nation as a
whole must remain diminished unless and until there is an acknowledgement
of,
and retreat from, those past injustices."xl As one commentator
has observed:
"The time is highly propitious for a fundamental reassessment of the Aboriginal!
non-Aboriginal relationship."85
There is a strong

case for the argument

that the Mabo judgement

can be

broadened beyond the realm of real property rights and extended to intellectual
property rights, provided that there has been a continued observation of Aboriginal
customary laws despite the existence of the common law. Hecognition by the
Australian common law of "Aboriginal native title" in land must necessarily
imply recognition of Aboriginal communal rights in sacred designs.

Intellectual

Property Rights under Mabo and the Native Title Act 1993

Section

8(1) of the Copyright

Act, 19G8, provides

that no copyright

subsist except by virtue of the legislation. This seemingly insurmountable
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is easily overcome if Aboriginal intellectual property rights are viewed as sui
generis - altogether different from the Western conception of copyright. In
reviewing

the approach

to art taken by the Yolngu people of North-East

Arnhem

Land, .one commentator
demonstrates
the fact that Aboriginal perspectives on
intellectual property diverge from those of Western culture.xli Indeed, in viewing
art as inextricably linked to land, the Yolngu seem to fall sqarely within the
ambit of the Mabo decision which recognised native title and held that "the
nature and incidents of native title must be ascertained as a matter of fact by
reference to [Aboriginal] laws and customs."Xi
An action to protect proprietary rights in folklore could also be brought
under the Native Title Act, 1993, (Cth). Section 208(1) of the Act defines "native
title" as meaning "The communal, group or individual rights of Aboriginal peoples
or Torres Straight Islanders in relation to land ..." where such rights and interests
fall within the traditional laws and customs observed by the people, the people
have a connection with the land through those laws and customs, and "the
rights and interests are recognised by the common law of Australia." In effect
the same test for determining Native Title exists under the legislation as under
the Mabo decision itself.
However, this avenue for seeking protection of folklore, although it has the
advantage of looking directly to the laws and customs of indigenous peoples, is
not comprehensive.
Notably, those people who cannot demonstrate
to the
satisfaction of the Tribunal that they have a continuing connection with the land
through their laws and customs will not gain relicf. This could present a serious
problem for urban Aboriginal peoples.

Another Alternative·

An Equitable Action for Breach of Confidence

It has been cogently argued that recourse for Aboriginal peoples seeking to
pretect their sacred designs may be had to the equitable action for breach of
confidence.!\8 The basis for this proposition
is that an action for breach of
confidence can be brought to secure proprietary rights.x~l Moreover, no obstacle
necessarily arises when Aboriginal works are sold or otherwise disclosed since
the confidential aspect of the work may still be protected: "Merely because an
object or design has been published or is in some way open to public inspection
does not mean that the 'trade secrets' or sacred information encoded within it
thereby lose their quality of confidentiality."~'o In determining whether a breach
of confidence had occurred, resort should be had to Aboriginallaw.~11 Thus, like
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an action under the Mabo principles, this solution
peoples'own legal and customary tradition.

PROPOSALS

gives weight

to Aboriginal

FOR REFORM

Clearly, there are a number of ways in which Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander people can seek to protect their folklore and heritage under existing
legal structures. Yet the patchwork of protections, none of which is completely
comprehensive
in securing the rights of indigenous peoples over their cultural
heritage and folklore, is far from ideal.
Several committees

at the international

level have enquired whether copyright

was the right framework for folklore protection, e.g., the Joint Committe of
WIPO and UNESCO (l975).n In Australia, the need for such an inquiry arose
following well-publicised
concern in the early 1970s about the unathorised
reproduction of original artworks particularly as designs on tea-towels and souvenir
products.('J

Recommendation

of the Australian

Working Party of 198].91

The Working Party completed its deliberations in 1981 and concluded that
it was essential to protect the Australian Aboriginal folklore which, in the
Committe's view, was a national resource deserving protection both in the interests
of Aboriginal and of the general public. It found that the present Australian
copyright and design laws offered inadequate protection, and that mere amendment
of the Copyright Act was an unsatisfactory solution. The committee concluded
that the existing Australian law did not in general provide adquate legal protection
for Aboriginal artists when drawing upon their tradition. It made reference to
the hurdles in protecting folklore under the Copyright Act, 19G8, viz difficulties
relating to originallity, ownership, fixation, and term. Copyright protection was
also considered unsuitable in principle from a customary perspective.
The Working Party recommended
that there be a special, sui generis,
legislation, Le., an Aboriginal Folklore Act which should provide for (i) prohibition
on non-traditional
uses of sacred-secret material; (ii) prohibitions
on debasing,
mutilating or destructive uses; (iii) payments to traditional owners of items being
used for commercial purposes; (iv) a system of clearances for protective users of
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"The issue of legal protection of folklore was very much to the fore in initial stages of the UNESCO
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items of folklore; (v) an Aboriginal Folklore Board to advise the Minister on
policy matters; and (vi) a Commissioner for Aboriginal Folklore to issue clearances
and negotiable

payments. The report suggested

by the Aboriginal Folklore Board of proposed
customary users on a case-by-case basis.

a mechanism

for the examination

uses of items of folklore by non-

No special legislation has been enacted in pursuance

of the recommendations

of the Working PartyY" Instead, the issue of protection of Aboriginal folklore has
been debated, albeit in passing, by three other inquiries since the 1981 report.96
The 1981 Report

of the Working

Party defined

"Folklore"

in its broadest

sense. The definitional aspects lead to the two prime characteristics
of Aboriginal
folklore which uniquely present the legal difficulties in protection: the manner in
which it is developed and depicted, and the notion of collective ownership.
The Working Party's recommendations
amounted to an acceptance of a
notion akin to the moral rights concept in copyright law of certain countries of
the world, particularly those with civil law background. The main recommendation
is legislative
remuneration

recognition of the integrity of works of folklore and a scheme of
for traditional owners. It is most unfortunate
that to date the

Working Party's recommendations
federal government.!/7

have not been implemented

by the Australian

In 198G, the Australian Law Reform Commission published a major report
recommending
recognition of Aboriginal law in a number of specific situationsYs
A recent Australian inquiry on folklife has raised the important issue of economic
and moral rights regarding the collection and use of folklore. It is to be noted
that this inquiry was confined to Anglo-Celtic Australia and did not cover
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Aboriginal cultures. The report presented 51 recommendations
to the government
regarding the study, conservation,
preservation,
and extension of folklife. The
report dwelled at length on the possibility of applying existing copyright pinciples
to folklore materials and suggested numerous solutions, e.g., a system of public
domain payments, a legal deposit requirments ensuring the acquisition of copies
of all materials for the national collections, a formal set of ethical standards, and
codes of practice in the documentaion , archiving and use of folklore materials,etc.!~l

Tunis Model Law on Copyright for Developing countries
The Tunis Model Law of 1976 recognized the need for economic recompense
and the need to protect a cultural legacy which is an essential part of the
community. The Committee of Governmental Experts was convinced that folklore
had the ability to fit within the copyright mould. It provided for protection of
economic and moral rights in folklore without limitation in time. The model
provisions provided that the rights in folklore were to be exercised by a "competent
authority", and not by indigenous owners. The competent authority would grant
authorisations
for any use of folklore made with gainful intent and outside the
traditional context. The Model Law also placed particular emphasis on the fact
that "[c]opies of the traditional folklore made abroad, and copies of translations,
adaptations, arrangements,
or other transformations
of works of national folklore
made abroad, without the authorization
of the competent authority, shall be
neither imported nor distributed" in the national territory. 1011 Three special features
of the Model Law deserve special mention. They are: (i) protection of folklore for
an indefinite period; (ii) exemption of folklore works from the requirement
of
fixation; and (iii) introduction of moral rights concept to prevent the destruction
and desercration of folklore works.
It is important to note that a number of countries have adopted the Tunis
Model Copyright Law, or parts thereof, and have hereby incorporated intellectual
property protection of folklore into their respective copyright laws. These countries
include Barbados, Burundi, Cameroon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Sri
Lanka, and Zaire. Algeria, Chile, Kenya, Senegal, and Tunisia had already adopted
similar measures before the advent of the Tunis Modellaw.101

PROTECTION OF FOLKLORE IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STA TES
The position in both Canada and the United States to a large degree
reflects that in Australia, with the notable exception of the Native Graves Protection
and Repatriation Act, 1990, in the United States, the intellectual property rights
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-of indigenous
peoples
indigenous peoples.

fall within

the same legal structures

as those

of non

In Canada there have been widespread
calls for a new approach to be
adopted. Most recently, the work of Amanda Pask and Rosemary Coombe has
adopted a line similar to that of the United Nations' special rapporteur,
EricaIren Daes. Both Canadian
researchers
recognise
the imperative
of giving
indigenous peoples control over their own heritage, but as yet these calls have
not been taken up by Canadian Governments. What emerges from the detailed
work of both these writers is that there is a fundamental
need to recognise
indigenous peoples' own laws and customs regarding culture, and that it is both
inefficient and inappropriate
to simply slot facets of cultural heritage into the
existing Western legal framework. As Coombe' acknowledges,
"Pirst Nations

peoples strive to assert that the relationship
that stories, images, motifs and
designs have to their communities cannot be subsumed under our traditional
European categories of art and culture and the possessive individualism that
informs them.ilI2
While the protection of native culture in the United States is more advanced
in either Australia or Canada, there exists no comprehensive scheme to cover all
aspects of indigenous heritage. The existence of the Native Graves Protection
and Repatriation
Act, 1990, however, does signal that there has been formal
acknowledgement
"that the sacred culture of Native Americans and IIawaiians is
a vital living heritage which is a crucial ingredient in the on-going lifeway of the
United States"Yu Developments in academic writings have. also progressed in
the United States, to the extent that a proposed "Model Tribal. Act to Protect
Cultural Heritage" has been drafted. WI

INTERN A TIONAL LA W AND TilE PROTECTION
PEOPLES' INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

OF INDIGENOUS

Berne Convention Provisions relating to folklore
The legal protection

of folklore has been an important

issue in international

copyright debate for more than two decades. ill:' The protection of folklore gained
international
prominence in copyright in the late 1960s. It was on the initiative
of the countries of Africa that a first international
meeting was organised under
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the auspices of BIRPI and UNESCO on the legal problems associated with
folklore. This meeting was held in Brazzaville in 1963. The first country that fell
into line with the conclusions of the Brazzaville meeting (later, in Geneva in
1964 and in Tunis in 1965) and introduced national protection for folklore and
works inspired by folklore was Tunisia. Article 6 of the Tunisian Literary and
Artistic Property Act, 1966, provided that floklore constituted
a part of the
national heritage, and that its exploitation with gainful intent by persons other
than those representing
public national organisations
required authorisation
from the Department of Cultural Affairs. The Act also provided that copyright in
works which has been inspired by forklore (i.e., composed with the aid of
elements borrowed from the cultural heritage of Tunisia and perpetuated
by
tradition) could not be assigned without the consent of the Ministry.

Article 15(4) of Berne Convention (Paris Act)
The Berne Convention, of which Australia is a signatory, contains a provision
allowing member countries to designate a competent authority to represent the
authors of works of folklore. The authority can assume full legal ownership or
act merely as a royalty collection agency on behalf of the indigenous creative
community. The Australian Copyright Act gives some effect to this convention by
granting Australian copyright protection
to unpublished
anonymous
foreign
authors provided the law of the country of origin has a similar provision.
As a result of the Diplomatic Conference of Stockholm in 1967 for the
revision of the Berne Convention, Article 15 (4) of the Stockholm (1967) and
Paris (1971) Acts of Berne Convention contains the following provisions:
(a)

In the case of unpublished

works

where

the identity

of the author

is

unknown, but where there is every ground to presume that he is a national
of a country of the Union, it shall be a matter for legislation in that country
to designate the competent authority which shall represent the author and
shall be entitled to protect and enforce his rights in the countries of the
Union.
(b)

Countries of the Union which made such designation under the terms of
this provision shall notify the Director General (of WIPO) by means of a
written declaration
giving full information concerning the authority thus
designated. The Director General shall at once communi<;ate the declaration
to all other countries of the Union.

It is disappointing
to note that the provision does not mention folklore,
because the committee was unable to work out an acceptable definition of
"folklore". However, the legislative history of the provision indicated that folklore
was (also) intended to be covered. In any case, folklore seems to fulfil the three
conditions

of Article 15(4), viz (i) the work must be unpublished;
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(ii) the, author

should be unknown,
Berne Union.lIIfi

and (iii) the author

Be that as it may, the amendment

should be a national

does not appear

of a country

of the

to have been effective

since no notification has been received by the WIPO as yet concerning designation
of a national authority to protect in countries of the Union the rights in works of
authors of unknown identify.
CONCULSIONS

AND RECOMJJ1ENDA TIONS

Australia's Bicentennial year (1988) saw the ratification of the Barrunga
Statement
which is a culmination
of discussion
between government
and
Aboriginal representatives
recognizing certain Aboriginal rights including the
protection
of and control of access to sacred sites, sacred objects, artefacts,
designs, and works of art. So far there have been talks, reports, inquiries and
"statements"
which point to government
recognition of Aboriginal customary
laws regarding ancestral designs. However, there has been no legislation to
enforce this recognition.
Despite extensive effort and expenditure over the last 20 years comparatively
little has been done in the way of recognising Aboriginal culture. This continuing
failure is in stark contrast with the position in the United States, Canada and
New Zealand, e.g., the North American Indians have for a long time been
recognised "as collectivities with their own legal status and powers, and with
collective title to their lands."1Il7 Various solutions have been suggested, ranging
from a sui generis protection to all-out protection under the copyright law.
However , what is remarkable
to note is that everyone involved has been
unanimous in support of giving protection to Aboriginal folklore. This consensus
ad idem should be enough by itself to instigate some legislative activity in this
matter of national and global significance.
The protection

of Aboriginal

folklore

is a national

obligation

but it has

been neglected by successive governments and institutions within the country. It
needs no reminder that without legal protection, Aboriginal folklore is moribund.
Changes in government
policy towards Aborigines have been slow and halfhearted. However, there seems to be the acceptance of the idea that Aborigines
have (within certain limits) the "choice" to retain their racial identity and their
folklore.1II8 The pressures
for change gained impetus from the ] 967 National
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course for resolving them" 3 Ngulaig

Referendum,
which, by an overwhelming
majority,
Parliament to enact special laws for Aborigines. J{l!,

empowered

the

federal

Folklore represents an essential segment of the living cultural heritage of
the Australian Aborigines, developed and maintained by this world's oldest extant
communities
for centuries. We have seen that the indiscriminate
dissemination
of various expressions
of folklore can lead to improper exploitation
of the
cultural heritage of the nation. Abuses of commercial or other nature of any
denaturation
of folklore is prejudicial to the cultural and economic interests not
only of the indigenous people but of the whole nation.
Only a very small fraction of Aboriginal creators are willing or able to
assert their intellectual property rights since litigation is fraught with the risks
and uncertainties
of the legal process. Most of the unauthorised
commercial
exploitation of Aboriginal folklore stands only because it is never challenged by
litigation in the courts. However, when such a case does arise, there occurs an
out of court settlement.
Until the Australian
legal system fully appreciates
and recognises
the
Aboriginal folklore, the indigenous peoples of Australia, like their counterparts
of Anglo-Celtic background will forever remain victlTIS of the dreaded "cultural
cringe,"] 10
European
settlement
of Australia brought about the dispossession
and
dispersal of Aboriginal people from their lands and the destruction of much of
their cultural
heritage
. Of all the injustices
done to Aboriginal
people,
expropriation
of their traditional land and flagrant exploitation and destruction
(without recompense) of their folklore are the losses they feel most keenly.111
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Supru, n. 6, at 80 A stcrn warning has been given recently in thesc words: "Over the ages. indigenous
pcoples have developed innumerable technologies and arts. They have de\'ised ways to farm deserts
without irrigation and produce abundance from the rain forest without destroying the delicate balanec
that maintains the ceosystem; they ha\'e learned how to navigatc vast distances in thc Pacific using their
knowledge of currents and the feel of intermittent waves that bounce oif distant Islands; they havc
explored the medicinal property of plants; and they ha\'c acquired an understanding of the basic ecology
of flora and fauna. ~1uch of this expertise and wisdom has already disappeared. and if neglected. most of
the remainder could bc gone within the next generation."

III

This sentiment

has been succinctly expressed by Deane and Caudron.

JJ,

on their recent decision in

Muho lJ. The Slule of (}ueenslunJ. Supru, n. 8. at 449 in thc following words: "An early flash point with
one clan of Aborigincs illustrates the first stages of the conflagration of oppression and conflict which
was, over the following century, to spread across the continent to disposses, degrade and de\'astate the
Aboriginal pcoples and Iea\'c a national legacy of unutterable shamc.
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